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Abstract  
Food security emerged as a major source of political deadlock in the WTO Doha Round 
negotiations. Concerns about food security only intensified at the WTO following the 2008 
Global Food Crisis, with the Bali and Nairobi Ministerials revealing polarized views between the 
US and India on the financing of public food stockholding. These “food fights” at the WTO have 
attracted significant international media, civil society and scholarly attention. In this article, I 
argue that inter-state disagreement on food security is not new or specific to the Doha Round but 
instead has been a recurrent phenomenon in the multilateral trade system for decades. Employing 
an historical approach, I show that food security has repeatedly been an item of negotiation in 
successive GATT negotiating rounds and has been steadily codified in international trade law 
over time. Today, food security is deeply integrated into the rules of the trade regime, making the 
WTO an important yet largely unacknowledged institution in global food security governance.  
 
 
                                                 
1 I am thankful to the two anonymous reviewers, the editor, Kristen Hopewell, William Coleman, Tony Porter and 
Robert O’Brien for helpful comments. All errors remain my own. 
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Introduction 
Food security has been among the most contentious issues in the WTO Doha Round 
negotiations. Such a situation was not envisaged when the Doha Round began in 2001. Food 
security issues were expected to be minor items, with WTO members setting out to consider the 
well-known concerns of a subgroup of net-food importing developing countries and tightening 
up rules on international food aid (FAO, 2003; Clapp, 2004: 2013). Following the 2003 Cancun 
Ministerial, new food security concerns were added to the agenda. These new concerns were 
raised in the context of negotiations of the Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM), intended to 
address import surges and to protect food security and rural livelihoods in developing countries. 
Food security concerns were also raised on the negotiation of Special Products, which would 
permit developing countries to undertake lower tariff reduction on agricultural products critical 
for national food security. The SSM, in particular, has been a major source of disagreement 
between developed and developing countries. The lack of consensus on how this agricultural 
safeguard should be designed and implemented was the key contributing factor behind the 
breakdown of the Doha Round negotiations in 2008 (Wolfe, 2009).  
The 2008 Global Food Crisis intensified the debate on food security at the WTO. The 
crisis, which was characterized by high and more volatile food prices, prompted debate among 
WTO members over whether existing trade rules were sufficiently flexible for countries to 
pursue agricultural policies to ensure food security (De Schutter, 2011; Lamy, 2011; Häberli, 
2012; Matthews, 2014; Margulis, 2014a; Farsund et al., 2015). The widespread use of 
agricultural export prohibitions and restrictions by several WTO members undermined many 
states’ confidence in the ability of international trade to ensure their national food security 
(Cardwell and Kerr, 2014; Murphy, 2015). At the 2011 Ministerial in Geneva, WTO members 
discussed the possibility of a new work program on food security, including financial support for 
net-food importing and least developed countries (LDCs) to address their concerns about high 
and volatile food prices. Yet at that Ministerial, members were unable to agree on proposed rules 
to address concerns about the rising use and non-reporting of agricultural export prohibitions and 
restrictions, demonstrating the widening rift among members on how best to address food 
security concerns within the trade regime (Margulis, 2014b). Disagreements on how to address 
food security were also behind the high stakes showdown between the United States and India on 
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the purchase of staple foods at administered prices for public stockholding at the 2013 Bali 
Ministerial; once again, WTO members were wide apart in their views on which additional trade 
flexibilities and exemptions should be provided to developing countries to address food security 
(Wilkinson, Hannah and Scott, 2014; Stewart and Bell, 2014; Kripke, 2015). At the 2015 
Ministerial Meeting in Nairobi, WTO members once found agreement elusive on two prominent 
food security issues: a permanent solution to ensure India’s national food stockholding programs 
would be free from legal challenge and how to operationalize the SSM.  
 There is a demonstrable pattern of increased focus on, and repeated breakdown in, the 
WTO negotiations over food security issues. This suggests that a lack of agreement among 
participants on how best to address food security concerns has emerged as a major stumbling 
block to the conclusion of the Doha Round. Inter-state disagreement over food security issues at 
the WTO has also become an increasingly high profile issue. These new “food fights” at the 
WTO have attracted significant scholarly, media, and civil society attention, especially since the 
2008 Global Food Crisis, when global food security became a priority issue in world politics and 
international cooperation (Clapp and Cohen, 2009; Margulis 2009; 2013).  
In this article, I argue that inter-state disagreement on food security is not new or specific 
to the Doha Round but instead has been a recurrent phenomenon in GATT multilateral trade 
system. I show that food security has been a long-standing point of contention in negotiations 
and one which has frequently eluded agreement. The bargaining history of food security in the 
GATT has been under-analyzed and thus the purpose of this article is to illuminate the present by 
providing a longer historical perspective. In a similar methodological vein to recent studies 
seeking to provide a fuller account of the GATT’s history (see Pauwelyn, 2005; Wilkinson and 
Scott, 2008; Scott, 2010; De Souza Farias, 2013; Lamp, 2015), I support my claims by drawing 
on the historical record of past GATT negotiations in order to trace the history of food security in 
the multilateral trading system.2  
I develop four interrelated points based on a historically-informed analysis of food 
security in GATT multilateral trade negotiations prior to the Doha Round. First, nearly every 
                                                 
2 The primary sources for this research are publicly available archives of GATT negotiations obtained from the 
GATT digital library hosted by Stanford University and the archives of the UN Food and Agriculture Organizations 
and UN Conference on Trade and Development. In addition, I draw on semi-structured interviews of current and 
past senior GATT and national trade officials.  
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GATT trade round that involved negotiations on agriculture dealt with some sort of food security 
dimension. Second, the history of food security in the multilateral trading system begins much 
earlier than the conclusion of the Agreement on Agriculture in the Uruguay Round and the 
creation of the WTO. I show that food security has a rich and extensive history in the GATT and 
has been a contested issue since the origins of the trade regime in 1947. Taking a longer-term 
historical perspective, I chronicle how food security concerns have repeatedly arisen in 
multilateral trading negotiations and how such concerns have been framed and addressed by 
states in different ways over time.  
Third, a recurring pattern of conflict is evident in the negotiations on food security in the 
multilateral trade system, with a significant divide between agricultural exporting countries and 
net-food importing countries. Agricultural exporting countries have consistently advanced 
positions promoting the liberalization of food imports. In sharp contrast, net-food importing 
countries have sought additional flexibilities for agricultural commodities perceived as vital to 
national food security and for compensatory financing measures to address concerns about 
potentially higher food prices. These diverging views on trade and food security remain a 
persistent source of disagreement among states in the context of multilateral trade negotiations 
on agriculture. Fourth, many of the specific food security issues that have been most 
controversial in the WTO Doha Round –  such as agricultural export restrictions, special 
safeguards and food stockholding – are not in fact “new” negotiating items but issues that have 
been raised in the past and the subject of considerable debate in previous GATT negotiations. To 
provide an illustrative example: agricultural export restrictions, which were widely used during 
the 2008 Global Food Crisis and generated heated debate at the WTO, were similarly a major 
issue for the trade regime during the 1940s and 1970s. Many of the hot button issues in the Doha 
Round can thus be considered old wine in new bottles. 
 The article is organized as follows. The next section examines changing conceptions of 
food security in global governance since the end of the Second World War. I then provide a 
historical analysis charting how food security has been incorporated in the trade system since its 
earliest days. First, I consider the food security provisions negotiated in the Havana Charter and 
the elements that were later incorporated into GATT 1948. I then turn to analyzing engagement 
with food security issues over the course of four sets of GATT trade negotiations: the Dillon 
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Round (1960-61), Kennedy Round (1963-67), Tokyo Round (1973-1979), and Uruguay Round 
(1986-1994). The last section provides conclusions and reflections on the forgotten history of 
food security in the multilateral trading system. 
 
 
Food Security in Global Governance3  
The prevailing understanding of food security as an issue in global governance has evolved over 
time, in parallel with advances in knowledge and technology, changing conditions in the world 
economy and corresponding changes in the interests and preferences of national and international 
policymakers (Shaw, 2007; Candel, 2014).  
  One of the principal objectives of the post-war international system was to eradicate 
hunger. The architects of the post-war system held a conviction about the international 
community’s collective responsibility to fight hunger and a belief in the vast potential for 
advances in nutrition and agricultural science to achieve this end. In this context, they created the 
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in 1945, the first United Nations (UN) specialized 
agency, to raise world nutrition levels and improve food production and distribution. By the late 
1940s, the FAO began work on the international coordination of grain production and trade in 
order to stabilize food prices and redistribute surplus food produced from the West to meet the 
needs of the hungry in the developing world. However, this effort came to an end when the US 
and UK withdrew support for an internationally managed food supply scheme (Staples 2003; 
Shaw, 2007).   
Concerns about a potential world shortage of food emerged in the 1960s, largely 
prompted by a Malthusian reading of the combination of rapid population growth and lagging 
food production in developing countries. Western states established the UN World Food 
Programme (WFP) to provide food assistance to developing countries. A key mechanism 
enabling international food aid was the burden-sharing system established under the 1967 Food 
Aid Convention, which was a product of GATT negotiations on agriculture (discussed below). In 
addition to food aid, developed countries during this period scaled-up bilateral and multilateral 
assistance to foster food production in developing countries by financing technological transfers 
                                                 
3 This section builds on Margulis (2013). 
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and the introduction of higher-yield seed varieties, fertilizers and pesticides (i.e., the first “Green 
Revolution”). While such food assistance served multiple humanitarian and trade objectives for 
donors, this was a significant development in the evolving practice for world food security 
because it further concretized the norm of, and expectations for, international cooperation on 
hunger.  
 The term food security first entered the policy lexicon during the 1970s in the context of 
an unexpected shortage of wheat in 1973 that drove international grain prices skywards and 
caused panic on markets. This was the first officially recognized World Food Crisis. The crisis 
revealed both a new driver of hunger – price volatility – and that international food markets 
would not always ensure adequate supplies. The events of the 1970s challenged assumptions 
about how world food markets worked and drew attention to the need for new instruments of 
international cooperation to eradicate hunger. Governments met at the 1974 World Food 
Conference and agreed to deepen cooperation, including establishing new bodies such as the 
International Fund for Agriculture Development (IFAD) and Committee for World Food 
Security to address the new drivers of food insecurity (UN, 1974). Although the World Food 
Conference produced political consensus on the need to address food security, the return of 
stability to international food markets soon after diminished the sense of urgency for major 
reform. Despite this shift of attention, the conference’s longer-term impact was to establish 
international consensus on the need for an “international agricultural policy” (Josling, 1985: 
274). 
The concept of food security continued to evolve, incorporating advances in the 
understanding of the causes of hunger. In particular, the work of Nobel Prize winning economist 
Amartya Sen – which demonstrated that access to food, and not just food supply, was critical to 
averting famine – reoriented international policies to look beyond traditional food production and 
supply issues (Drèze and Sen, 1991; FAO, 2003b). This new conception of food security 
recognized various dimensions – supply, availability, utilization, and access – and initiated a 
major rethinking of international food security policies away from the old approach of traditional 
bulk transfers of food supplies towards incorporating a set of more targeted interventions (i.e., 
directed at challenges facing poor households and with a focus on livelihoods) (Maxwell and 
Slater, 2003). In addition, food security came to be seen as part of a wider package that extended 
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beyond calories consumed to include adequate nutrition and access to clean water (Pinstrup-
Andersen, 2009). This multifaceted understanding became the basis of the current international 
consensus definition of food security negotiated by states at the 1996 FAO World Food Summit, 
which remains today the accepted basis for international and national food security 
policymaking.4 At the 1996 Summit governments committed to reduce world hunger by half. 
This commitment became the later basis for the first Millennium Development Goal to reduce 
the number of hungry people by half by 2015. Governments have subsequently increased this 
ambition in the Sustainable Development Goals by calling for an end to hunger by 2030.   
Taken together, these developments shaped the construction of food security as an issue 
area for international cooperation. The desire to eradicate hunger alongside an evolving 
understanding of food security was reflected in changing institutional arrangements and 
governance practices. This wider context is important for understanding the bargaining history of 
food security in the GATT/WTO. 
 
The International Trade Organization and GATT 1948 
I start with examining food security issues in the context of the UN negotiations on the Havana 
Charter for the International Trade Organization (ITO) in 1947. Agriculture and food security 
concerns weighed heavily on the minds of the architects of the post-war economic order. An 
acute policy concern was the inability of Europe to feed itself and the threat this situation posed 
for peacetime reconstruction. In addition, the US required Europe and other food importing 
countries to absorb its surplus agricultural production. However, this situation was a source of 
growing commercial tensions between the US and other major food exporters such as Canada, 
Argentina, and Australia, with the latter seeking to maintain their access to the European market.  
 Agricultural trade was a major part of the Havana Charter negotiations (UN, 1948a). In 
the 1940s, agriculture continued to be a significant economic sector and source of employment, 
production, and foreign exchange for both developed and developing countries. The vision for 
the ITO was to increase trade in agriculture but to retain many flexibilities, especially for 
developing countries (Hudec, 1987; Onyejekwe, 1993).   
                                                 
4 The current definition is: “Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical, social, and economic 
access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food which meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and 
healthy life.” 
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The Havana negotiations addressed multiple food security issues. Among these was the 
use of unilateral food export prohibitions and restrictions. This was a sensitive political issue due 
to wartime experiences where food shortages and rationing had been common. There was an 
expectation among states that the new peace situation would permit a resumption of food 
production in Europe and normal trade in food. However, the inherent volatility of agricultural 
production meant that importing states remained concerned that major producing countries could 
still resort to agricultural export restrictions, which could lead to critical shortages of food and 
non-food commodities on international markets. Such situations were a source of considerable 
international political tension (and had been during the war). International cooperation on export 
restrictions and prohibitions was thus seen as highly desirable by most states, and most acutely 
by net-food importing countries, to bring order back to food markets. 
 States therefore agreed under the Havana Charter to permit agricultural export restrictions 
and prohibitions only on a temporary basis “for the period necessary to prevent or relieve critical 
shortages of foodstuffs or other products essential to the exporting Member country” (UN, 
1948a: 34). The proposed rules on export restrictions recognized the principle that domestic food 
security came before international trade. However, the proposed rules created a new expectation 
that export bans would only be undertaken under special circumstances and only on a temporary 
basis and were, therefore, an aberration from normal trade policy practice. The new international 
approach to agricultural export restrictions and prohibitions was consistent with how food 
insecurity was understood during this period. Policymakers regarded hunger as principally a 
supply problem and international cooperation to diminish the threat of export bans was intended 
to ensure the smooth flow of food from surplus to deficit countries.  
 The Havana Charter was also important for food security as it enshrined international 
cooperation in the management of the world food supply in international law. It is well known 
that the Charter established the legal framework for the post-war intergovernmental commodity 
agreements (ICAs), with the impetus to reduce price fluctuations and balance world supply and 
demand for key food and non-food commodities (UN, 1948a; see also Gilbert, 1997; Raffaelli, 
1995). Yet a less appreciated objective of ICAs in the Havana Charter was to achieve food 
security. While much of the stated rationale for ICAs lay on the premise of achieving “fair” 
prices for consumers and “remunerative” prices for producers, the Charter also recognized that 
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ICAs could play a role in the expansion of consumption of basic foodstuffs. Article 57 
(Objectives of Inter-governmental Commodity Agreements) permitted the establishment of ICAs 
in appropriate cases for “the distribution of basic foods at special prices” (UN, 1948a: 78). The 
reference in the text to “special prices” means food available at below market prices or on 
concessionary terms (a practice, for example, consistent with what the US had done for its allies 
during the war). This objective highlighted post-war concerns and realities of expected food 
surpluses among the food exporters (who had significantly increased production capacity during 
the war years) and the difficulties of importing countries to afford sufficient supplies at 
prevailing market prices.  Not only did the Havana Charter provisions on ICAs anticipate this 
problem, its architects articulated an early recognition by states of an implied obligation for food-
producing countries to distribute food on non-commercial terms. This obligation prefigured the 
international food aid regime that emerged decades later. 
  As is well known, the attempt to establish the ITO failed after the US Congress declined 
to ratify the Havana Charter, jettisoning the idea of a formal international organization with 
authority to govern international trade until the creation of the WTO in 1995. Instead, states kept 
some of the provisions from the Havana Charter and incorporated them into the GATT 1948, 
which became the basis for the post-war international trading order (Krueger, 1998; Drache, 
2000).  
There were elements of both continuity and change in how food security issues were 
treated in the Havana Charter and GATT. The GATT mirrored certain provisions in the ITO, 
such as permitting governments to apply food export restrictions and prohibitions on a temporary 
basis. Yet, there were also significant differences. While the ITO was intended to cover both the 
agricultural and industrial sectors and included extensive rules for each, the GATT included few 
rules on agriculture and in practice, due to the extensive use of exemptions, largely excluded 
agriculture from international trade disciplines (GATT, 1961a; Trebilcock and Howse, 2005). A 
key difference was that GATT 1948 did not include ICAs, which had been a central part of the 
ITO’s mandate to coordinate world agricultural supply and trade (Josling et al., 1996). This 
omission is significant for understanding how the relationship between trade and food security 
was envisaged because a key objective of the Havana Charter had been to make foodstuffs 
available at below market prices through ICAs. With the failure of the ITO, the initial 
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momentum dissipated for an international trade mechanism intended to make food more 
affordable for food importing countries.   
 
Pre-Uruguay Round GATT Negotiations  
In this section I demonstrate the decades long history of food security in the GATT prior to the 
Uruguay Round. I do this by charting how food security issues have been raised, framed, and 
negotiated in the GATT. This includes analysis of food security-related bargaining proposals 
introduced by the contracting parties5, the evolving negotiation agenda, and inter-state 
negotiation dynamics. Under consideration are both cases of completed bargains on food security 
arising from GATT negotiations (such as the conclusion of new agreements, trade rules, 
governance practices, and/or international policy instruments), as well as instances of non-
agreement. It is important to consider non-agreement in the negotiations alongside agreement 
because the former informs about key issues on the agenda for which consensus proved too 
difficult. Non-agreement can also influence the course of future events, if for example, a non-
agreement becomes the source of unresolved political tension that can come to shape inter-state 
relations over longer time horizons. This is especially important in multilateral trade negotiations 
given their iterative quality; repeated interaction among states over successive negotiation rounds 
means that past events shape the future. It will be shown that negotiations on food security has 
been an ongoing subject of multilateral trade negotiations, resulting in agreement and non-
agreement at the GATT. 
 
The Dillon Round (1960-62) 
GATT contracting parties pursued substantive negotiations on agriculture in the Dillon Round. 
The main impetus for launching the Dillon Round was the establishment of the European 
Economic Community (EEC) in 1957. The US demanded a new round in order to conclude tariff 
negotiations in advance of the EEC’s common external tariff taking effect in 1962 (US, 1958). 
The liberalization of agricultural trade, alongside the reduction of industrial tariffs and the 
incorporation of newly independent developing countries, were the core issues on the negotiating 
                                                 
5 A point of clarification – “Contracting Parties” refers to states party to the GATT. This is equivalent to the term 
“WTO Members” that similarly refers to states or custom unions that have acceded to the WTO. 
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agenda. With respect to agriculture, GATT contracting parties had agreed to consider “problems 
arising out of the widespread use of nontariff measures for the protection of agriculture, or in 
support of the maintenance of incomes of agricultural producers” (GATT, 1958). Contracting 
parties were principally focused on the negative effects that import barriers and price supports 
had on the level and patterns of international agriculture trade (Hoekman and Kostecki, 2001). 
Food security issues were not initially on the negotiating agenda; however, as the 
negotiations advanced, the intertwined issues of agricultural surpluses and food aid took on 
significant importance. The disposal of agricultural surpluses as international food assistance, 
especially by the US, was already by this time a major source of trade tensions among 
agricultural exporters. Canada and Australia, for example, regarded existing international rules to 
minimize food aid’s distorting effects on commercial agricultural trade in the 1954 FAO 
Principles on Surplus Disposal as insufficient. These countries were especially concerned with 
the market development element of US food aid.  
This was a period of expansion of the use of food surpluses for humanitarian assistance 
and to promote economic development in developing countries. The UN had just agreed to set up 
a temporary world food agency intended to increase the provision of food aid. In this context, 
food exporters (not food importers) pressed for stronger rules to prevent commercial 
displacement. Contracting parties agreed to add agricultural surpluses to the negotiation agenda 
in 1961. The negotiations on agricultural surplus disposal involved consultations with the FAO 
and other international organizations to provide information on international food security 
developments. The chair of the negotiations concluded that a key issue facing the Contracting 
Parties was how to dispose of surpluses given the limited purchasing power of poor countries 
and thus “the extent that governments are able to make available their abundance of food to low-
income food deficit countries on a grant basis or on other concessional terms without 
displacement of normal commercial trade, and to the extent that such food can be directed into 
additional total consumption” (GATT, 1961b: 10). In other words, the question was how to 
balance trade versus aid concerns. 
The Dillon Round is notable as it saw the emergence of food exporters’ critique of 
surplus disposal in trade negotiations. Wheat exporters such as Canada, Australia and Argentina 
drove and shaped this critique. They accused the US of dealing with its domestic wheat 
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overproduction by subsidizing non-commercially viable exports as food aid and were 
particularly concerned by the US’ expansion of long-term concessionary sales of wheat on credit 
as food assistance. Given that wheat was the most important food grain in the world food 
economy of the time (Friedmann, 1982), exporters’ primary concerns were the impacts that 
surplus production/food had on depressing international wheat prices and the competitiveness of 
their exports. The consideration of developing countries’ food needs was secondary to concerns 
about lost market share. An extensive review of Contracting Parties’ agricultural policies during 
the negotiations revealed this critique with the chair of the negotiations stating:  
 
Wheat provides the best example of the effect on international trade of price support 
measures causing export surpluses leading to pressures for disposal on subsidized or 
concessional terms…In its Review of the World Wheat Situation of April 1960, the 
International Wheat Council found that total wheat and flour exports covered by 
special governmentally assisted export programmes made up nearly 28% of world 
wheat and flour exports. Indeed, since about 1953 a fairly important increase in the 
world trade in wheat and flour has been almost entirely due to non-commercial 
transactions which have made possible increased consumption. (GATT, 1961b: 5-6) 
 
Food exporters’ critique of surplus disposal framed the discussions on food security in the Dillon 
Round. The same critique would also reappear and shape negotiations on food security issues in 
subsequent GATT trade rounds. 
Interestingly, it was not the developing countries, the main recipients, who raised 
concerns related to food aid. Robert Hudec (1987: 44-46) argues that developing countries were 
single-mindedly focused on the removal of trade barriers by developed countries in the round. 
The Dillon Round was seen by the GATT as an opportunity to address the specific problems 
identified in the 1958 Haberler Report, which had confirmed that the terms of trade for 
developing countries had deteriorated and supported the inclusion of special and differential 
treatment in the trade regime (Hudec, 1987; Toye and Toye, 2004; see also Lamp, 2015).  
The Dillon Round failed to achieve a broad agreement. In the case of agriculture, limited 
progress was made on addressing import barriers. However, the US negotiated with the EEC for 
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duty-free bindings on soybeans, linseed, flaxseed, oilseed meal, and cotton, which was seen as a 
major triumph (Finger, 1974). However, contracting parties agreed that agricultural surpluses 
would be the subject of future GATT negotiations and notably provided the GATT with a new 
surveillance function for international food aid. Whereas such a role had been previously the 
exclusive domain of a FAO subcommittee on surplus disposal, a trial monitoring mechanism for 
surplus disposal was initiated with the expectation that contracting parties would report details of 
their policies and provide a detailed record of all food surplus transactions to the GATT 
Secretariat. This marked a shift in the trade regime’s approach to food security with the GATT 
delegated authority to monitor states’ food security policies. 
In sum, food security was negotiated in the GATT Dillon Round. Contracting parties 
debated issues concerning the supply-side of international food assistance, which was consistent 
with the understanding of food security at the time as primarily a supply issue, and concerns 
about the trade distorting effects of food aid in a substantive manner in the context of multilateral 
trade negotiations for the first time. States also delegated new functions to the GATT to monitor 
international food aid. 
 
The Kennedy Round (1963-1967) 
Food security was prominent in the Kennedy Round negotiations. At the outset of the round, 
contracting parties differed in their concerns and positions over which world food problems 
might be addressed in the GATT (Rehm, 1968; Norwood, 1969). The principle world food 
problems at the time were linked to concerns about rapid population growth and declining per 
capita food production in developing counties that were predicted to create widespread food 
shortages and political instability, especially in India (Koffsky, 1967). This was also a period of 
major expansion of bilateral food assistance programs by developed countries, but also the 
tightening of world grain supplies after years of gluts on international markets.  
Another new and important political dynamic was that developing countries were 
increasingly disaffected with the GATT. Primarily through the work of the Group of 77 (G77), 
developing countries convened the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 
1964 in order to address their trade-related concerns. This included the negotiation of new 
preferential and commodity agreements (Toye and Toye, 2004). The creation of UNCTAD 
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meant that the GATT was no longer the only game in town when it came to multilateral trade 
negotiations. This development marked a shift in the GATT’s policy towards developing 
countries, including a greater effort to seriously address developing countries’ demands for 
improved market access (Hudec, 1987:55-58). This was a historical moment of great uncertainty 
and contestation over the future shape of the multilateral trade system.  
According to Irwin Hedges (1967), who advised the US government during the 
negotiations, there were four main objectives with respect to agriculture: 1) increase grain 
exporters’ access to EEC markets; 2) renegotiate an international floor price for wheat; 3) adjust 
global wheat supply in line with growing world commercial and non-commercial demand; and, 
4) establish a multilateral food aid program. Contracting parties also engaged in extensive 
discussions about the strategic use of grain surpluses with the view of better coordination of 
domestic policies to reduce volatility in international grain prices (GATT, 1962). The round was 
characterized by the US and EEC at loggerheads on how to achieve price and supply stability. 
The EEC proposed the measuring and binding of all support to agriculture (i.e., montant de 
soutien), whereas the US pressed for major agricultural tariffs reductions (Josling at al., 1996: 
62-66).  
A key food security item on the agenda of the Kennedy Round was the issue of food self-
sufficiency in the context of negotiations to manage international grain supplies. Food exporters 
were keen to establish a world supply management scheme for grains as part of a broader 
strategy to discourage the UK and France from moving towards a policy of food self-sufficiency 
(Hedges, 1967). By the mid-1960s the UK and EEC nations, the latter only recently starting to 
operate under the new Common Agriculture Policy (CAP), were in a process of building up their 
support price schemes to expand domestic grain production. Achieving agricultural self-
sufficiency was a food security policy objective of the CAP. However, EEC policy to ramp up 
domestic food production had the effect of increasing competition in international grain trade, 
with food exporting countries finding their access to the Western European market shrinking. 
During the negotiations, the EEC proposed incorporating a self-sufficiency ratio into GATT 
rules. A self-sufficiency ratio establishes the relative proportion of domestic production and 
foreign imports that make up total food consumption; in the context of the GATT, this would 
have served as the basis for the EEC to set the total volume of agricultural imports permitted into 
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its market. The EEC proposal was intended to lock in its ability to provide support and to address 
food exporters’ concerns of access to the European market by guaranteeing them a fixed 
proportion of the market.   
Contracting parties established a “Wheat Group” to facilitate negotiations on the EEC’s 
food self-sufficiency policy. The group included developed country exporters such as the US, 
Canada, Australia and one developing country exporter, Argentina. Food importing developing 
countries were excluded and this led to complaints by India (1967) about the negotiation process. 
During the talks, the EEC proposal of binding self-sufficiency at 90% was not regarded by 
exporters as a satisfactory offer. After two years of negotiations, the EEC proposal to lock in 
food self-sufficiency ratios was eventually withdrawn but without reaching a broad agreement on 
agricultural market access. Instead, negotiations shifted its focus to work on an international 
agreement for wheat (US, 1966; Josling et al., 1996: 65-67).  
 The most significant development in the Kennedy Round for world food security was the 
proposal by grain exporters to establish permanent international mechanisms for food aid. By 
1964, states had already been discussing the creation of a permanent multilateral food aid 
program at the UN. These discussions also took place at the GATT. The US called for the 
negotiations to include talks on the orderly disposal of surpluses for food assistance through 
multilateral channels, including the suggestion that importers in addition to exporters contribute 
food. In other words, the US pressed for a burden-sharing approach to international food aid. 
Argentina circulated a proposal that called for the establishment of a multilateral food fund made 
up of cash and in-kind food donations. The stated purpose of this fund was to expand multilateral 
hunger eradication efforts, but also to counteract the depressing effects of bilateral food aid on 
world prices (Argentina, 1965). The competing logics of humanitarian, trade and foreign policy 
objectives were evident in the GATT negotiations, where the idea of a burden-sharing system 
meant: 
 
Food aid contributions were viewed primarily as one of the means of achieving the 
objectives of access and joint participation in supply management. A food aid 
program to which both exporters and importers pledge specific contributions would 
provide an outlet for excess production and help strengthen and stabilize commercial 
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grain markets. At the same time it would represent a beginning toward a more 
equitable distribution of the burden of meeting the food aid requirements of 
developing nations. (Hedges, 1967: 1335) 
 
Contracting parties achieved consensus on an approach to govern multilateral food aid. This 
would result in significant changes in the way in which states dealt with world food supply 
management.  
The Kennedy Round negotiations resulted in two important and interrelated international 
agreements: the Wheat Trade Convention (WTC) and the Food Aid Convention (FAC). The 
WTC established floor and ceiling prices for wheat, and intended to more smoothly manage 
international wheat production and prices. The FAC committed states to providing a fixed 
quantity of grains (mostly wheat) as international food assistance and set out international best 
practices and a reporting and monitoring mechanism for international food aid flows (GATT, 
1967). The WTC and FAC were seen by states as a solution for managing the international wheat 
market, while simultaneously ensuring surpluses were disposed of as food aid with the least 
distortions to commercial trade.  
It is important to emphasize that the general framework and main provisions of the WTC 
and FAC were negotiated during Kennedy Round negotiations. Only once contracting parties 
had agreed on the key elements that the finishing touches on the WTC took place at the 
International Grains Council. Similarly, the FAC was later shifted to the FAO for the completion 
of operational details prior to its ratification under the UN system as an international treaty only 
after the key issues were settled in GATT negotiations. Both the WTC and FAC were plurilateral 
agreements and included all the major grain exporters and importers: Argentina, Australia, 
Canada, Denmark, Finland, Japan, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK, US, and EC. These 
countries were the most important countries in the world wheat market except for the Soviet 
Union, which was not a part of GATT negotiations. This group of signatories satisfied the US’s 
demand for a burden-sharing approach to food assistance.  
The GATT Kennedy Round’s importance for world food security has been all too often 
underestimated. The round resulted in inter-state agreement on a minimum level of international 
food aid commitments in the form of annual quantitative pledges by a subset of contracting 
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parties. It moved the food aid system toward greater predictability of supply and accountability 
of donors. The FAC provided (at least until quite recently) assurance of stable grain supplies that 
the WFP could expect to draw on for its food assistance activities. Although the Kennedy Round 
did not result in new GATT rules on agriculture, the GATT was the forum in which states 
negotiated the basis of the emerging international food aid regime. In other words, the Kennedy 
Round negotiations demonstrate the GATT’s role as a key forum for inter-state negotiations on 
food security issues of that time.  
  
The Tokyo Round (1973-1979) 
Agriculture was front and center on the negotiating agenda in the Tokyo Round, which called for 
the Parties to “take account of the special characteristics and problems in this sector” (GATT, 
1973b: 4). The objectives of the round were to address tariff escalation and non-tariff barriers 
across industrial goods and commodities, including agricultural goods. The GATT Tokyo Round 
is particularly relevant to food security for several reasons, including: 1) the addition of food 
security to the agenda after the round began due to external real world events; 2) the initiation of 
a GATT-led process to clarify the relationship between food security and trade rules; and, 3) the 
consideration of an international food supply management scheme to ensure food affordability.  
The timing of the Tokyo Round is important as the negotiations were just getting 
underway when the World Food Crisis struck. That crisis, similar to the recent Global Food 
Crisis, led to a sharp and swift rise in grain prices and panic on world markets. States resorted to 
food export restrictions and prohibitions. The US enacted a soy bean export, initially starting 
with an all-out ban before shifting to a system of export controls, in order to address domestic 
food price inflation and consumer pressure (Friedmann, 1982). Net-food importing developing 
countries, also severely affected by high oil prices at the time, found their food imports 
threatened by severe balance of payments difficulties.  
 While the world food security problem was not initially on the negotiating agenda for the 
Tokyo Round, once the magnitude of the food crisis was apparent, it became a major item of 
discussion among the contracting parties. Concerns over tight international food supplies, and the 
implications for agriculture trade and international political stability, elevated food security to a 
major item on the negotiation agenda.  
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At the first meeting of the Trade Negotiations Committee in 1973 to set the agenda, 
contracting parties discussed the relationship between the round and the upcoming FAO World 
Food Conference intended to address the food crisis. In his first report to the Trade Negotiations 
Committee, the chair of the GATT group on agriculture had identified that “there may be special 
problems affecting trade in certain commodities, such as those relating to food security, which 
may also require special attention” (GATT, 1974d: 6). This implied that contracting parties were 
well aware of the linkages between trade in agriculture and world food security. At this meeting, 
the US (a strong supporter of the FAO-led World Food Conference) clarified that the GATT was 
the only forum where trade commitments could be negotiated to address the trade-related aspects 
of the world food problem. The US did not see the need for shifting agriculture trade issues into 
the UN; rather, the US regarded the work of the GATT negotiations and FAO as complementary 
(GATT, 1973a).  
 Once the Tokyo Round negotiations were underway, the contracting parties tasked the 
GATT Secretariat to produce studies on agriculture production, trade, and consumption patterns. 
This work sought to improve their understanding of the trade-related dimensions of world food 
supply and provide a basis for future decisions on agricultural trade liberalization (GATT, 1974a, 
1974c, 1974d, 1974b, 1974e). Trade negotiators continued to view the problems in terms of an 
undersupply of food, even though the Rome-based discussion at the FAO had started to broaden 
out to also encompass food price volatility and speculation. Contracting parties did not share a 
consensus view on the causes of the World Food Crisis, which became an increasing point of 
tension in the negotiations.  
In order to facilitate discussions on agricultural trade and the world food problem, all 
delegations were requested by the GATT Secretariat to submit in writing their views on the 
causes of, and conclusions to be drawn from, the changes in world agricultural markets (GATT, 
1974b). Contracting Parties’ submissions to the GATT revealed diverging views with respect to 
the role of the GATT and trade policy in addressing world food security. The US was of the view 
that agricultural trade liberalization and greater interdependence were necessary to overcome the 
boom and bust cycle of agricultural prices, which it argued posed a threat to world food security 
(US, 1974). Other exporters identified the food self-sufficiency policies of the EEC and other 
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countries as having depressed world agriculture prices in the years prior to the crisis and having 
made international markets less responsive. The latter position was expressed as follows:  
 
Among the contributory factors underlying and aggravating the present shortages 
were the policies which created uncertainties in the market. Without some certainty 
of access to markets, there was little incentive to increase production. Agricultural 
production cannot be turned on and off like a tap in response to stop-go measures 
taken by governments. While it might not have been possible to avoid shortages 
altogether, their impact might have been lessened had the supplying countries had 
security of access. The last few years had shown that when prices exceeded certain 
levels, protective devices became unnecessary and had in certain instances been 
relaxed or suspended by some major importers. Thus, if world prices were at or 
above remunerative levels, bigger trade flows resulted. On the other hand, account 
must also be taken of consumer reaction to high prices leading to decreased demand, 
and of rapid price fluctuations which generate uncertainties for producers. (GATT, 
1974e: 3) 6 
 
Contracting parties spent considerable time debating the causes and consequences of the food 
crisis during the negotiations. They disagreed on whether the crisis was temporary or likely to be 
long lasting and on the feasibility of various proposals for increased international cooperation on 
food security.  
Despite diverging positions on the causes of the food crisis, there appeared to be 
consensus towards the desirability of some form of international supply management for key 
grains such as rice (echoing earlier failed efforts during the Kennedy Round). Canada, for 
example, proposed that contracting parties undertake substantive reforms to ensure the “security 
of supply of agricultural products at reasonable prices” (Canada, 1974: 2). In order to further 
explore the international supply management scheme, a “Sub-Group on Grains” was formed and 
delegated to further work on the issue. Unlike the Wheat Group of the Kennedy Round that was 
                                                 
6 This statement was not officially attributed in the GATT report to a specific contracting party but it was likely 
made by a food exporter such as Canada, Australia or Argentina. 
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limited to food exporters, the Sub-Group was more inclusive and involved forty contracting 
parties. These ranged from developed to developing countries and food exporters to importers. 
The GATT also invited UNCTAD, which continued to work on ICAs, as an official observer to 
the talks (GATT, 1975a).  
Two competing approaches to international food supply management dominated the work 
of the Sub-Group on Grains throughout 1975 and 1976. Food exporters stated their priority was 
liberalizing trade in grains. This met with some resistance from the EEC, which highlighted 
instability in grain markets as the central world food problem rather than the lack of 
liberalization (EEC, 1975). Developing countries, in contrast, wanted consistency between the 
GATT negotiations and the emerging world food security agenda coming out of the UN on 
ensuring food affordability. Developing countries in their intervention had, 
 
[E]mphasized the need for ensuring the security of supplies at reasonable prices for 
importing developing-countries, taking specially into account the needs of the most 
seriously affected countries….including measures being discussed in the 
International Wheat Council and in the framework of the International Undertaking 
on World Food Security in pursuance of the decisions of the [UN] World Food 
Conference. (GATT, 1975b: 1)  
 
Hardening positions on grains trade become increasingly evident as the Tokyo Round 
progressed. On the one hand, a negotiation bloc formed among the EC, Japan, and developing 
countries that pushed for international grain management, while on the other hand, the US 
argued strongly for addressing agricultural market access, export subsidies, and safeguards (US, 
1975). India pushed for measures to support agricultural production in developed and developing 
countries and for the establishment of a system of international food reserves and stockholding to 
ensure affordable food to developing countries (India, 1976).  
Diverging positions pointed to a growing disagreement on how to address food security 
within the GATT negotiations. By the Sub-Group on Grains May 1976 meeting, it was apparent 
that there was a deadlock on food security with the chair reporting, 
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 Given the amount of work that remained to be done, and in light of the date now set 
for the completion of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations, it was noted, with regret, 
that little progress had been made since the Sub-Group's last meeting in narrowing 
the differences between some of the major trading countries. (GATT, 1976: 2) 
 
After this meeting, the Sub-Group on Grains did not reconvene for the remainder of the Tokyo 
Round. The reasons for the collapse of the GATT negotiations on international food supply 
management were threefold. First, disagreement among the contracting parties over the basic 
parameters persisted and no suitable compromise emerged. Many governments supported a 
world supply management scheme for grains while others, notably the US, demanded that the 
negotiations focus on reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers. Given its pre-eminent role as the 
world’s principle food supplier during this time, the US preferred not to support an outcome that 
would have been potentially burdensome to it. Its firm position was that an “international trading 
structure based on liberalized national trade policies is by far the most reliable and efficient basis 
for ensuring the availability of adequate grain supplies to meet world needs” (US, 1976: 1). As 
with agricultural issues more generally in the Tokyo Round, a deal was not in the making.  
 Second, the work of the Sub-Group on Grains overlapped with similar negotiations 
elsewhere. In order to keep discussions going as momentum faded in the GATT, the work of the 
Sub-Group was first shifted to the International Wheat Council, which had a mandate to consider 
international grain trade problems. Later, work on international food supply management was 
shifted out again as developing countries sought to incorporate multilateral talks on wheat into 
the negotiations on international commodity agreements underway at the UN Conference to 
Negotiate an International Arrangement to Replace the International Wheat Agreement of 1971 ( 
Lamond, 1977; Bergesen, 1980; Cohn, 1979). The failure to find compromise within the GATT, 
combined with the availability of other forums and the forum-shifting strategies of states, 
resulted in negotiations on international food supply management being shifted out of the GATT 
and into other international venues. 
Third, world food prices had declined considerably by 1975 and supply conditions 
improved markedly. Though most prices of foodstuffs remained consistently high until the early 
1980s (FAO, 2009b: 11), the relative improvement in world food markets eased the sense of 
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urgency that had prevailed during the onset of the Tokyo Round negotiations. Many 
governments interpreted improving market conditions to mean that the necessity and rationale 
for investing political capital on international coordination and cooperation for food security was 
no longer required. As a result of these three factors, negotiations on food security in the GATT 
came to a halt without consensus among the contracting parties. The lack of consensus on food 
security and international trade rules would become even more apparent during the Uruguay 
Round negotiations. 
 
The Uruguay Round: Institutionalizing Food Security in the Trade Regime    
I now turn to how food security issues were negotiated during the GATT Uruguay Round. This 
round receives additional attention because it marked a turning point in food security’s place in 
the trade regime. Earlier GATT negotiations were characterized by negotiations on food security 
that eventually shifting out to other international bodies. The Uruguay Round negotiations broke 
this pattern and instead marked a shift toward the institutionalization of food security issues in a 
rules-based framework. The Uruguay Round also requires additional attention because its 
resulting rules formed the basis for the subsequent Doha Round negotiations. 
 To appreciate the dynamics of the Uruguay Round and how food security was treated in 
the negotiations, the specific historical state of world agriculture needs to be considered. In 
contrast to the Tokyo Round that began during an episode of skyrocketing food prices, the 
Uruguay Round was launched in a period of falling food prices. Declining food prices were the 
direct outcome of an agricultural export subsidy war between the US and EC. Each engaged in 
one-upmanship by providing producers, who were sitting on large agricultural surpluses, with 
direct governmental assistance in order to better “compete” in world markets, but which greatly 
depressed the prices of agricultural goods and led to domestic farm crises (Wolfe, 1998; 
Watkins, 1991; Friedmann, 1982). Though export subsidies made food cheap on international 
markets, they also had the effect of discouraging staple food production in developing countries 
while also undermining the competiveness of other grain exporters.7 Meanwhile, agriculture had 
come to be viewed by developing country as the “backwards” sector (Hirschman, 1978; Roa 
                                                 
7 For example, in the early 1980s, US and EC wheat entered Mali and Burkina Faso at prices 40% lower than local 
grains (GATT, 1993). 
  
22 
 
1986); many taxed agriculture to fund industrialization, often resulting in policies that were 
biased in favor of urban over rural populations and that resulted in a prolonged period of 
underinvestment in agriculture (Krueger et al. 1988; Bezemer and Headey, 2008; Anderson, 
Rausser and Swinnen, 2013; Hopewell, 2016).   
 The Uruguay Round also occurred during a paradigmatic shift in economic policy ideas 
and practice. The 1980s were the period when the “Washington Consensus” emerged as the new 
dominant paradigm in international economic policy circles, advocating a smaller role for the 
state in the economy and a greater role for markets (see Williamson, 2009). During this period, 
the policy consensus shifted towards the reform of developed countries’ agriculture policies, 
with the goal of reducing production and trade distortions (Swinbank and Tanner, 1996; 
Paarlberg, 1997; Skogstad, 1998; Coleman, 1998). To address soaring national debt and balance-
of-payments of problems, developing countries adopted structural adjustment programs 
involving unilateral tariff reductions in agriculture, a renewed focus on agricultural exports, and 
the privatization of marketing boards and other state-owned enterprises. In many cases, 
economic reforms by developing countries included the scaling back of state support for 
agriculture, including extension services and subsidized inputs for farmers and food subsidies for 
the urban poor. The dynamics above shaped the economic and political context of the GATT 
Uruguay Round negotiations on agriculture and food security.    
 
Setting the Negotiation Agenda: Free Trade vs. Food Self-Sufficiency  
Right from the outset of the Uruguay Round, food security concerns featured prominently in the 
negotiating agenda. The Committee on Agriculture and Trade undertook the task of elaborating 
the parameters of the future agriculture negotiations for ministerial approval. In addition to the 
general objective of “bringing trade in agriculture more fully into the multilateral trading 
system,” the Committee recognized the negotiations would need to consider a general 
declaration on food deficits and the development needs of developing countries (GATT, 1986: 
7). This reference to food deficits acknowledged the difficulty developing countries experienced 
in producing adequate food and/or earning sufficient foreign exchange to purchase food on 
international markets as a result of the 1980s petro-dollar debt crisis.  
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One of the early ideas discussed by the contracting parties in advance of launching the 
round was whether food security could provide justifiable grounds to invoke and maintain import 
restrictions and quantitative restrictions, as well as a basis for special and differential treatment 
(GATT, 1985). Indeed, once the round began, the Committee on Agriculture and Trade 
considered that guaranteeing food security should be a principal objective of the round and that it 
should be “taken as a point of departure in determining which rules should govern trade in 
agriculture” (GATT, 1986c: 33).  
 Although there was a consensus to bring stability to world agriculture markets, 
discussions over the unique role agriculture played in national economies exposed diverging 
views surrounding the extent to which contracting parties were willing to pursue trade 
liberalization in agriculture and how this was to be linked to food security. The chair of the 
agriculture negotiations identified two competing schools of thought concerning the relationship 
between agriculture, food security, and international trade. The first school consisted of states 
where less favorable production conditions prevailed and where “national policy objectives in 
the areas of food security, stability of domestic income and price support arrangements and 
regional development are seen by and large as taking precedence over broader international trade 
considerations” (GATT, 1986: 26). The other school, he identified, regarded such concerns as 
incompatible with greater trade liberalization and called for domestic policies to be adapted 
gradually to “market forces and comparative advantage” (GATT, 1986c: 26-27). This dynamic 
would come to shape the negotiations with one set of countries more generally supportive of 
food self-sufficiency and another advocating freer trade in food. 
Food security was a pivotal topic scheduled for discussion at the June 1988 meeting of 
the Negotiating Group on Agriculture (GATT, 1988a). This was a critical point in the Uruguay 
Round as at this moment the contracting parties were still clarifying their positions and the 
specific items to place on the negotiation agenda. The US proved to be the first mover on the 
issue and put forward its position arguing that freer trade in agriculture, rather than food self-
sufficiency, was most effective for achieving food security. In its initial agriculture proposal, the 
US radically called for the elimination of all market access barriers and subsidies (US, 1988). 
The US argued that food self-sufficiency policies represented an inefficient allocation of 
resources that distorted world markets and that such policies were incongruent with the “reality” 
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of agricultural markets characterized by a growing number of reliable public and private 
suppliers (US, 1988).   
In a response to the US’s proposal, developing countries stressed that the primary 
obstacle to achieving food security was their limited ability to purchase foodstuffs at prevailing 
world prices. Free trade in food, and the food-import dependency this implied, was viewed by 
many developing countries as politically unacceptable and as impinging on national sovereignty. 
Many developing countries were well aware of the commercial interests behind the US position, 
given its unique position at the time as the world’s largest and unrivalled food exporter. Several 
developing countries called for the right to autonomously determine levels of food production 
and trade in the face of unpredictable international markets (GATT, 1988c).  
Jamaica, a net-food importer and strong voice for smaller developing countries during the 
round, offered an alternative approach to the US proposal. It advanced a proposal stating that 
food security could not be realistically divorced from ensuring a minimum level of food self-
sufficiency. Jamaica also elaborated the idea of framing food security in the GATT primarily 
from a developing country perspective and emphasized the need for the round to satisfy the 
minimum food needs of the poor and undernourished, reduce instability in food supplies and 
prices, and increase policy autonomy in food production at national, regional and sub-regional 
levels (Jamaica, 1988).  
Other developing countries such as Mexico, Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria, and Peru also 
raised food security concerns. These countries coordinated their positions in the negotiations to 
put forward the idea of transitory measures to address the potential impacts of trade liberalization 
on world markets in a joint agriculture proposal. Their proposal called for the Uruguay Round to 
address a range of food security concerns, including food aid, compensatory measures for food 
price increases, greater multilateral financing, investment for agricultural development in 
developing countries, and balance of payments support under the rubric of food security (GATT, 
1988b).  
 Middle-income and developed food-importing countries also weighed in on the food 
security debate. South Korea argued for the need to provide food-importing countries with the 
possibility to maintain a minimum rate of self-sufficiency for national food security (just as the 
EEC had proposed in the Kennedy Round) alongside trade liberalization commitments (South 
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Korea, 1988). Japan’s proposal called for the negotiations to address food security as a non-trade 
concern. Japanese negotiators also stressed the critical importance for net-food importing 
countries to maintain a minimum level of production of basic food stuffs given their significant 
vulnerability to the dictates of market swings: 
 
Stable supply of such "basic foodstuffs" is essential for every country from the 
viewpoint of food security. For countries whose self-sufficiency rate of foodstuffs is 
particularly low, the need to maintain a stable level of domestic supply is 
indispensable to safeguarding the livelihood of their citizens. This is a political 
requirement which transcends a mere logic of economy. (Japan, 1988: 7) 
 
Japan’s views on food security reflected its historical experience with food shortages in the post-
war era and was informed by the important social and cultural role of rice production. Japan’s 
situation as a major net-food importer made it highly vulnerable to unpredictability in world 
supply and also to policy swings by food exporters, such as the US’s soybean embargo.  
Japan’s position in the round as a strong advocate for protecting domestic agricultural 
production for food security put it at odds with many developed and developing countries. In the 
negotiations, Japanese officials were heavily criticized for taking a protectionist position by 
developed country food exporters such as the US, Canada and Australia. Many developing net-
food importing countries were also critical of Japan because they argued for the need to 
differentiate between their food security challenges and those of wealthy net-food importers that 
had the purchasing power to more readily procure food on international markets. Some delegates 
went so far as to that claim Japan (and South Korea) were “abusing the concept of food security 
to unnecessarily restrict trade,” while others recognized that wealth alone did not guarantee that 
supplies would be available in times of international conflict or shortages (GATT, 1988c, 2). 
 Even though the contracting parties were divided on how to specifically treat food 
security, they agreed that food security would be an integral part of the negotiations on 
agriculture. The negotiation agenda for the Uruguay Round was formalized at the 1988 GATT 
Ministerial Meeting in Montreal. Although the term “food security” was not explicitly referred to 
in the official text of the Montreal ministerial declaration, ministers had agreed to address the 
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“possible negative effects” on net food-importing developing countries of trade liberalization as 
part of the agriculture negotiations (GATT, 1988d: 13).  
 
Negotiating Food Security  
Once the formal negotiations were underway in 1989, the politics of food security in the 
Uruguay Round became more contentious. Despite the Montreal ministerial declaration’s 
emphasis on developing countries’ food security concerns, there was immediate pushback by a 
group of developed food-importing countries demanding that the negotiations address their food 
security concerns as well. Switzerland, Japan, and Norway pressed for food security to be taken 
into account as a non-trade concern in the agricultural negotiations (GATT, 1989b). Non-trade 
concerns refer to the multiple functions of an economic activity, including its commercial and 
non-commercial aspects (Smith, 2000). In the case of agriculture, the most often cited non-trade 
concerns are food security, rural livelihoods, and environmental stewardship. Supporters of food 
security as a non-trade concern called for trade rules to provide flexibility to meet these other 
functions, including lesser commitments to liberalize agriculture. Most contracting parties 
accepted this perspective and, in order to placate the concerns of developed countries, there was 
agreement in 1989 to also incorporate food security as a non-trade concern in the round, stating: 
 
Participants recognize that factors other than trade policy are taken into account in 
the conduct of their agricultural policies. In the negotiations to achieve the long-term 
objective, account will be taken of proposals aimed at addressing participants' 
concerns such as food security. (GATT, 1989a: 11) 
 
In addition to already committing to address the impacts of trade liberalization on net-food 
importing developing countries, the inclusion of food security as a non-trade concern inserted a 
broader conception of food security into the negotiations that included consideration of its 
commercial and non-commercial qualities. This particular framing of food security, alongside 
the debate between free trade versus food self-sufficiency, would also significantly shape the 
food security-related negotiating agenda during the Uruguay Round.  
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Concerns about the possible negative effects for net-food importers became the basis for 
a new developing country bargaining coalition in the agriculture negotiations. Led by Egypt and 
referred to as the net-importers group (NIG), this bargaining coalition included Mexico, Jamaica, 
Peru, Morocco and claimed wide support among many developing countries. In the negotiations, 
the NIG pointed to the increase in world food prices between 1987 and 1989 as proof of the 
continued volatility in international food supply and the significant budgetary challenge for these 
countries in maintaining food imports (Egypt, 1989). These countries’ bargaining position was 
informed by the prevailing consensus among economists at the time that predicted higher future 
food prices as a result of trade liberalization proposed in the round (GATT, 1990b; Ballenger and 
Mabbs-Zeno, 1992; Onyejekwe, 1993; Matthews, 1994; Winters, 1994: 157-158). Higher food 
prices, after all, was one the desired outcomes of the round for agricultural exporters, especially 
in the wake of the US-EC subsidy war and the cycle of farm crises. A key demand of the NIG 
was for the negotiations to address rising food prices and the associated balance of payments 
problems this was expected to create, including calling for the provision of financial 
compensation from developed countries to cover the cost of rising food import bills (Knudsen, 
1990). In addition, the NIG demanded financial assistance from developed countries earmarked 
for increasing the production of basic foodstuffs essential for food security.  
Whereas the NIG group made demands for compensation, other developing country 
GATT members sought additional trade flexibilities for food security. Other net-food importing 
countries, such as Honduras and El Salvador, raised specific concerns about the unpredictable 
effects of trade liberalization on the domestic production of traditional foodstuffs (i.e., pulses, 
white corn, roots and tubers) that were critical to the food security of poor and indigenous 
communities. Central American countries advanced two food security proposals. The first called 
for additional, transitory measures to allow for gradual adjustments to a more open trading 
environment. Given uncertainty about the future, these countries proposed that all developing 
countries be allowed to implement agricultural safeguards to avoid the flooding of their markets 
by related commodities, such as US maize (yellow corn) displacing domestic white corn (i.e., the 
traditional staple food in the region) (GATT, 1990b). However, this proposal did not gain wide 
acceptance and was not given further consideration. In a second proposal, Central American 
countries demanded the continued right of developing countries to use agricultural export 
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prohibitions “in order to safeguard their food security in the event of shortfalls in the world 
supply of basic foodstuffs” (CACM Member Countries, 1990). Central American countries had 
by this time transitioned from food exporters to importers (similarly to many African countries). 
Food security was a sensitive political issue for these countries with large rural populations and 
characterized by significant instability in the countryside due to civil war and political conflicts. 
The proposal to retain export restrictions for food security purposes was in sharp contrast to the 
preference of the US to eliminate agricultural export restrictions and prohibitions. 
 While food exporters recognized the legitimacy of the food security concerns expressed 
by net-food importers, they were divided on how to address them. The US, Canada and Australia 
were uncomfortable with the idea of locking-in any commitments under the GATT framework to 
assist the NIG countries. This became a major point of contention between agricultural exporting 
developed countries and net-food importing developing countries during the course of the round. 
However, the negotiations on food security progressed steadily from 1989 to 1990, with the talks 
shifting from an emphasis on monetary compensation towards addressing rising food bills 
through a GATT administered policy framework (Egypt, 1989; GATT, 1989c; 1990c).  
On the issue of food security as a non-trade concern, a major sticking point in the round 
became establishing criteria for the measurement and categorization of the trade impacts of 
specific national agricultural policies to determine when non-trade concerns justified flexibility. 
A major divide remained among contracting parties over the extent to which non-trade concerns 
should be grounds for exemptions from reforming so-called restrictive trade policies, such as 
import controls and other tariff and non-tariff barriers to manage agricultural imports. 
Agricultural exporting countries, such as those in the Cairns Group, took a hard line on 
restrictive measures and iterated their position on non-trade concerns as follows: 
 
The Cairns Group recognizes that proposals related to non-trade concerns such as 
food security need to be taken into account in negotiations to achieve the long-term 
objective [establishment of a fair and market-oriented agricultural trading 
system]…However, proposals which contemplate the long-term retention of 
restrictions and distortions clearly would be inconsistent with that objective…..The 
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aim therefore should be to identify means to meet non-trade concerns which are not 
trade-distorting in nature. (Cairns Group, 1989: 2) 
 
The statement captures one end of the free trade versus food self-sufficiency spectrum that 
shaped the negotiations. The idea of legally binding self-sufficiency ratios, a policy intended to 
institutionalize food security as a non-trade concern and allow certain countries to offer less 
agricultural market access, continued to be supported by South Korea, Japan and India.8 Net-
food importers also supported the proposal since it was seen as reinforcing national policies to 
expand support to domestic food production capacity. The idea of binding self-sufficiency ratios 
under the GATT was emphatically rejected by the agricultural exporters. The US and the Cairns 
Group argued against food self-sufficiency, stating that such policies were ineffective, that they 
would directly damage the interests of trading countries and went against the objectives of the 
round which was to meaningfully liberalize agriculture (Cairns Group, 1989).   
International food aid was also a major item in the negotiations. The central concern for 
food exporters was to ensure that the potential reductions to be made in agricultural export 
subsidies would not lead to the misuse of food aid as an alternative escape valve for agriculture 
surpluses. Similar to earlier GATT rounds, agricultural exporters made clear they were 
particularly concerned about the misuse of food aid by the US for commercial purposes. Under 
pressure, the US put forward a proposal to distinguish bona fide food aid from surplus disposal 
or market development. Contracting parties did raise concerns that agricultural trade 
liberalization under the Uruguay Round could lead to reduced international food aid supply, 
however, this aspect of food aid did not receive as much attention in the negotiations as 
exporters’ concerns about competing with non-commercial food transactions. As a result, it has 
been argued that the concerns of food aid recipients were largely dismissed during the Uruguay 
Round (Hopkins, 1992).  
 
Food Security Negotiating Outcomes  
                                                 
8 Unlike the Kennedy Round, the EC in this instance was not a supporter of binding self-sufficiency ratios because 
by this point in time it had transitioned to a major food exporter, thus illustrating the changing composition of food 
exporters and importers over time. 
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The results of the GATT Uruguay Round in agriculture are well known. The Agreement on 
Agriculture (AoA) fully incorporated agriculture under international trade rules after repeated 
failures in the previous GATT rounds (Stewart, 1999; Croome, 1999; Hoekman and Kostecki, 
2001). The agreement included binding commitments to reduce agricultural subsidies and tariffs, 
with special and differential treatment for developing countries. The AoA initiated a long-term 
process of trade liberalization in agriculture, largely focused on reducing developed countries’ 
subsidies and other forms of protectionism that were deemed to distort markets and prevent free 
trade. Moreover, the AoA was also critical in setting the course towards policy convergence in 
agriculture among developing and developed countries. There is a wide debate on the impacts, 
fairness, and effectiveness of the AoA. Rather than repeating this debate, my focus here is on 
examining how food security issues became codified into the rules of the trade system.    
The extent to which the provisions of the AoA set out rules and commitments that 
applied specifically and directly to food security is underappreciated. In fact, a broad range of 
such provisions were included in the agreement. Food security was recognized as a non-trade 
concern in the agreement’s preamble, which sought to address the concerns raised by developed 
country food importers by confirming these concerns as legitimate in principle but lacking 
specific rules.9 The agreement contained several food security provisions related to domestic 
support and export competition (listed in Table 1). On domestic support, the agreement includes, 
for example, specific food security-related rules in the so-called Green Box category of 
minimally trade-distorting support measures in Article 6 (i.e., measures classified under WTO 
rules as a form of direct government support that was understood to distort the functioning of 
self-correcting markets, but remained permissible under specific conditions and limits prescribed 
in the agreement). These are further specified in Annex 2 of the Agreement, which defines 
measures such as support for resource poor farmers, public food stockholding, direct food 
subsidies and domestic food assistance programs are permitted on food security grounds. In 
export competition, for example, Article 10.4 of the Agreement established new rules on 
international food aid, requiring that food aid not be tied to commercial sales and accord with the 
                                                 
9 The preamble stated “Noting that commitments under the reform program should be made in an equitable way 
among all Members, having regard to non-trade concerns, including food security and the need to protect the 
environment; having regard to the agreement that special and differential treatment for developing countries is an 
integral element of the negotiations, and taking into account the possible negative effects of the implementation of 
the reform program on least-developed and net food-importing developing countries.” (WTO, 2001a)  
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rules set in the FAO Principles on Surplus Disposal and FAC. The main purpose of these rules 
being to prevent the dumping of surpluses as food aid. Article 10.4 is significant because 
although it built on existing rules in the FAO Principles and FAC, it resulted in a new form of 
issue-linkage between trade law and international food aid, with the WTO taking on the role of a 
centralizing institution because of its binding international law that hardened these other “soft 
law” international food aid agreements.  
 
 
Table 1. Selected Food Security Provisions in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture 
Article Item Relevance to food security 
Article 6 
 
 
Domestic Support 
Commitments 
Describes permissible forms of government assistance to agricultural 
and rural development, including domestic food aid and investment 
subsidies and agricultural input subsidies targeted at low-income or 
resource-poor (i.e., food insecure) producers in developing countries. 
Article 10.4 International Food Aid Establishes the criteria for differentiation between legitimate 
international food aid and disguised government export subsidies. 
Article 12 Disciplines on Export 
Prohibitions and 
Restrictions 
Sets out consultation process for implementation of export restriction 
or prohibitions permitted to relieve critical shortages of foodstuffs or 
essential products. 
Article 16 Least-Developed and 
Net Food-Importing 
Developing Countries 
Refers to the obligations under the Decision on Measures Concerning 
the Possible Negative Effects of the Reform Programme on Net-Food-
Importing Countries. 
Annex II, 
Paragraph 3. 
Public Food 
Stockholding For Food 
Security 
Specifies the conditions under which governments may accumulate 
and hold stocks of agricultural products that form an integral part of a 
food security programme.  
Annex II, 
Paragraph 4. 
Domestic Food Aid Establishes requirements that domestic food aid programs established 
clearly-defined criteria nutritional objectives and conditions for eligibility 
for recipients to buy food either at market or below-market prices. 
 
 
 
The most significant negotiating outcome of the Uruguay Round for food security was a 
side-agreement to address the concerns of net-food importers referenced in Article 16 of the AoA 
– the Decision on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the Reform Programme 
on Net-Food-Importing Countries (known as the Marrakech Decision). The Marrakech Decision 
represented a compromise between the US/EC and the NIG, and required WTO trade ministers 
to formally recognize that trade liberalization could lead to higher world food prices. It 
committed them to reviewing the level of international food aid at the WTO and providing 
favorable financing for food purchases and technical assistance to affected countries (WTO, 
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1994c). At the time, net-food importing developing countries saw this as a very significant 
agreement; it was a guarantee of a food security safety-net measure in exchange for their 
acceptance the US-EC proposal on agriculture, which was pivotal to securing broad agreement to 
conclude the negotiations. Following the end of the Uruguay Round, there has been debate 
among WTO members about the obligations set out in the Marrakech Decision and its legal 
status as a “decision” rather than an “agreement”. Framing this is a “decision” reflected a 
compromise by agricultural exporters to ensure it did not have the same legal status as an 
agreement while this satisfied net-importers preference to ensure decision-making remained 
within the trade regime.  
 Taken together, the food security provisions in the AoA and the Marrakech Decision 
marked a significant juncture from earlier GATT rounds by codifying food security into the rules 
and practices of the multilateral trade system. This also had the effect of formalizing the 
authority of the WTO in global food security governance, as it rules are legally binding under 
international law when most other international food security agreements under the FAO, FAC 
and WFP are non-binding, soft-law arrangements. 
 
Implementing Food Security in the WTO 
The key food security debate in the implementation phase of the Uruguay Round agreement 
revolved around the Marrakech Decision. Following the establishment of the WTO in 1995, 
there were several episodes of high food prices (FAO, 1999a; Sharma and Konandreas, 2008). 
During these episodes, net-food importers called for the implementation of the Marrakech 
Decision, demanding that developed countries provide them with assistance in times of high food 
prices. However, the US, Canada, and Australia resisted efforts to implement the Marrakech 
Decision, justifying their position by arguing that it was impossible to empirically demonstrate 
that higher food prices were directly related to trade liberalization under the AoA rather than 
other market factors. In addition, the years following the establishment of the WTO saw a sharp 
decline in the volumes of international food aid provided, which some analysts partially 
attributed to the Uruguay Round agricultural reforms (Clay and Stokke, 2000: 31). At the 1996 
Singapore WTO Ministerial, developing countries sought to bring greater attention to food 
security issues, unsuccessfully calling for a working group on trade and food security to be 
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established in order to explore implementation issues affecting food insecure developing 
countries. By this time WTO members had come to see the Marrakech Decision as a “paper 
tiger” and net-food importers claimed that this represented a broken promise by developed 
countries to meet the spirit of the Marrakech Decision (WTO, 2001d; FAO, 1999a).10   
 
Conclusion 
As this article has shown, disagreement over food security issues is not a new or distinctive 
feature of the WTO Doha Round. Rather, inter-state disagreements on how to address food 
security in trade negotiations have a long history dating back to the Havana Charter negotiations 
in 1947. At the same time, the GATT has been an important forum for inter-state cooperation on 
food security. This is most evident in the instances of agreement, ranging from GATT 
monitoring of food aid in the Dillon Round to the negotiation of the FAC during the Kennedy 
Round. A historically-informed analysis of food security in multilateral trading negotiations 
shows important parallels between the past and present. Food security issues that have been key 
points of conflict in the Doha Round – including international food aid, export restrictions, food 
stockholding and agricultural safeguards – have all been the cause of inter-state disagreement in 
previous trade rounds. Another important parallel is the role of external events in shaping 
multilateral trade negotiations. For example, the GATT Tokyo Round and the WTO Doha Round 
both saw the negotiating agenda on food security expanded, and inter-state disagreement become 
more pronounced, in response to world-scale food crises. A final discernible parallel is the 
continuing divide between net-food exporting and importing countries with respect to broadly 
conflicting perspectives on the relationship between international trade and food security in 
multilateral trade negotiations. However, the parameters of this divide have changed 
significantly over time. During the Dillon and Kennedy round negotiations, the main divide was 
between a small group of agricultural exporting countries (i.e., US, Canada and Australia) and 
net-food importers such as the EC and Japan. From the Tokyo round onwards, the group of net-
food exporting countries has become larger and more diverse – it now encompasses a wider 
range of countries including the US, EC, Canada, Brazil, Thailand, and others – at the same time 
that an increasing number of developing countries have transitioned from net-food exporters to 
                                                 
10 Confidential interviews with developing and developed country officials, Geneva, April 2009. 
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net-food importers and are concerned about their vulnerability to food price volatility and supply 
shocks.11 The GATT’s bargaining history also shows that the perspectives and problems that 
have informed the negotiations on food security in the multilateral trading system are not 
consistent over time but fluid, responding to changing conditions in the world economy and 
states’ own perceptions of their relative national food security/insecurity status at different points 
in time. 
 Taking a longer-term, historical view of the agendas and outcomes of successive GATT 
negotiations, we see that food security has been slowly but steadily integrated into the trade 
regime over time. The conclusion of the Uruguay Round was a pivotal development in this 
regard in that it marked the codification of food security issues into the trade regime, resulting in 
the WTO covering a much wider range of agriculture and food security policies (i.e., domestic 
and international food aid, food stockholding, and special provisions for net-food importing 
developing countries). This marked a change from the Kennedy and Tokyo rounds when the 
implementation and governance of food security issues were shifted out of the trade regime into 
other institutions such as the UN. Today, due to the codification of food security into the rules of 
the multilateral trading system, the WTO’s rules are highly consequential for domestic and 
international food security policymaking. As a result, the WTO now plays a considerable role in 
global food security governance. This article has thus shown the need to be attentive to the 
history of food security in multilateral trade negotiations that predated and shaped the Doha 
Round.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 For a discussion on the changing taxonomy of net-food importing developing countries see Valdés and Foster 
(2012). 
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